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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
Tiger Act as meaning "a surreptitious concealment or that which
is not visible to the naked eye" and pointed out that there had
been no concealment of intoxicating liquor by the druggist in the
instant case.3 3 Such a holding as to the scope and application of
the Blind Tiger Act will not preclude the possibility of convic-
tions for violation of the provisions of the Local Option Statute.
The propriety of convicting a druggist under the 1948 Local
Option Law for sales upon a licensed physician's prescription and
for purely medicinal purposes is a matter which was not raised
or decided in the Kolb case.
INSURANCE
Alvin B. Rubin*
PUBLIC LIABILITY POLICIES
Notice of loss--direct action. The nature of the direct action
against the insurance company originally authorized by Louisi-
ana Act 253 of 1918 has been the subject of extended litigation.'
As amended by Louisiana Act 55 of 1930, the statute provides for
a direct action by any injured person against the defendant's
insurer and states that "any action brought hereunder shall be
subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy contract and
the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct
action brought by the insured. .. ."
In a series of decisions, the supreme court has held that the
insurer could not avail itself of defenses "personal to the in-
sured."' 2 The statutory phrase quoted above was not involved,
but these decisions did show a clear intention to expand the scope
of the remedy available to the injured third person.
Another group of cases raised a problem which directly con-
cerned these words. Every public liability policy contains a
clause requiring the insured, as a condition of the insurer's lia-
bility, to notify the insurer of any accident. The phrasing of
these clauses varies, but their general purpose is to enable the
insurer as soon as possible after an accident to commence an
investigation and take such other action as it may deem neces-
sary either toward settling the claim or preparing for litigation.
33. 45 So. 2d 891, 895 (La. 1950).
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For a general discussion of this act, see Miller, Aspects of a Public
Liability and Property Damage Policy in Louisiana, 15 Tulane L. Rev. 79
(1940).
2. See, for example, Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 182 La. 171,
161 So. 191 (1935) (action by wife against husband's insurer); Ruiz v. Clancy,
182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1934) (action by minor children for negligence of
their father resulting in death of their mother).
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In Jackson v. State Farm Mutual,3 decided in 1946, the notice
to the insurance company was given eighty-two days after the
accident. The supreme court concluded that notice was not so
untimely as to deprive the injured third person of his rights
against the insurer because each case must be decided upon its
own' facts and the facts there shown did not make the delay
unreasonable.
In West v. Monroe Bakery4 the question of timely notice was
once again presented. The policy required notice "as soon as
practicable." The insured never gave notice of the accident,
which happened on January 2, 1945. The injured third person
filed suit on January 7, 1946, and mailed a copy of its petition to
the insurance company, which arrived on January 14, 1946, over
a year after the accident. The insurance company was joined as
a defendant to the suit by a supplemental petition on May 2, 1946.
Under these circumstances, the court of appeal held that the
notice was not timely and that the insurance company was re-
leased from liability under the policy. The supreme court granted
writs, and reversed the decision of the court of appeal.
The supreme court reasoned that the direct action statute
creates substantive rights in the injured third person. The stat-
ute expresses "the public policy of this State that an insurance
policy against liability is not issued primarily for the protection
of the insured but for the protection of the public.5 . . .[W]here
the third person is not at fault ... he cannot be made liable for
the breaching of an agreement by the insured with his own
insurer." Justice Hamiter concurred in the decree. Justices Haw-
thorne, McCaleb and LeBlanc dissented.
As for the statutory clause making the direct action subject
to the policy defenses, the majority opinion quoted with ap-
proval Judge Kennon's dissenting opinion in the court of appeal,
stating that this applied "only to the amount which might be
recovered and to those other warranties and conditions with
which it was within the power of plaintiff to comply.""
The earlier decisions referred to above clearly indicated a
path along which the supreme court trod one further step in
reaching this decision. Despite long and heated argument in
3. 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177 (1946), court of appeal decision noted in 6
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 729 (1946), 20 Tulane L. Rev. 452 (1946).
4. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950). See decision of court of appeal in 39
So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1949).
5. Quoting at 46 So. 2d 122, 130 (La. 1950), from Davids v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 199 La. 459, 6 So. 2d 351 (1942).
6. 46 So. 2d 122, 130 (La. 1950).
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legal and insurance circles, the legislature has never acted to
repudiate the earlier decisions. The majority opinion in the West
case continues to look to wider horizons. So far as can be ascer-
tained, no other jurisdiction has given so broad an interpretation
to the direct action statute.7 The difficulties which this interpre-
tation place on the insurer are obvious. But the insurers select
their own customers and contract with them. It may be that a
cause of action in favor of the company for failure to provide
notice might lie against the insured. In any event where the
matter of fault or negligence in the original accident is clear,
little ultimate damage is done by failure of notice, save the possi-
bility of effecting a quick settlement; certainly, if there is fraud
or collusion between the insured and the claimant, the court
would protect the insurer.
Omnibus clause. The so-called omnibus clause in the typical
automobile public liability insurance policy extends coverage to
any person using the automobile "provided the actual use of the
automobile is with the permission of the named insured." In 1938,
in the case of Parks v. Hall,8 the Louisiana Supreme Court
adopted a liberal construction of this clause (which did not then
contain the word "actual") and held that only initial permission
of the named insured was necessary, and that a later deviation
from the purpose for which permission had been granted did not
deprive the driver of coverage under the clause.
It has been previously pointed out in a comprehensive study
of the omnibus clause that this is only one of three views taken
by the various courts which have considered the subject, the
other views being (a) that such initial permission alone does not
suffice, and that the nature of the particular deviation will be
considered, with "material" deviations destroying that initial
permission, the various courts in this group differing widely on
what are "material" deviations; and (b) that the particular use
of the automobile at the moment of the accident must hae been
with the express or implied "permission" of the named insured.9
Subsequent to the decision in Parks v. Hall, the "initial per-
mission" test was applied in a number of decisions by the courts
of appeal and by the supreme court.'0
The most recent consideration of the clause by the supreme
court prior to the present term was in Waits v. Indemnity Insur-
7. 46 So. 2d 122, 128 (La. 1949).
8. 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938).
9. See Miller, The Omnibus Clause, 15 Tulane L. Rev. 422 (1941).
10. These decisions were cited at 46 So. 2d 744, 747 (La. 1950).
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ance Company of North America," in which the initial permis-
sion test was applied and coverage was found even though an
employee who had been authorized to use a vehicle for business
only had removed it contrary to instructions after working
hours.12
A similar problem was again presented in Dominguez v.
American Casualty Company.' 3 One Williams had been em-
ployed as the driver of a truck for a period of about four or five
months by Thomas, who operated a saw-mill and sold wood.
Williams' duties were to drive employees to the mill in the
morning, deliver loads of wood during the day, and take the
employees back to town in the evening, after which he drove the
truck to his home and parked it until the following morning. One
night after parking the truck at his home, Williams removed it
and went to the assistance of a fellow employee, whose car had
run into a ditch, with the intention of pulling the car back onto
the highway. On his way back to his home, Williams and the
plaintiff had an accident. The plaintiff sued Williams, Thomas,
and Thomas' insurer for damages.
The court found that the case fell within the general doc-
trine of Parks v. Hall. Chief Justice Fournet concurred in the
opinion. Justice Hawthorne dissented. "So far as I can ascertain,
no other state in the Union has extended the initial permission
rule so far."
LIFE AND DISABILITY POLICIES
Double indemnity provisions. In Franklin v. Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York,' 4 suit was brought for double
indemnity benefits under a policy of life insurance. The policy
provided for double indemnity "Upon receipt of proof that the
Insured died as a direct result of bodily injury effected solely
through external, violent, and accidental means, independently
and exclusively of all other causes ... directly or indirectly from
disease or bodily or mental infirmity."
The court affirmed a decision of the trial court denying recov-
ery. It was necessary for plaintiffs to prove "that the injuries
received in the conceded accident were the predominant cause
of death.""' The court stated that plaintiffs must prove their
11. 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d 746 (1949).
12. See Note commenting on this case in 21 Tulane L. Rev. 251 (1940).
13. 217 La. 487, 46 So. 2d 744 (1950).
14. 216 La. 1062, 45 So. 2d 624 (1950).
15. See 29 Am. Jur. 748, Verbo Insurance, § 916.
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case "by a preponderance of the evidence," reinforcing their con-
clusion by reference to the words of the policy provision quoted
above: "upon receipt of proof."
Disability benefits. In the case of Robbert v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States 16 the insured brought suit
to recover monthly benefits for total and permanent disability
and to recover premiums paid on his insurance policy during the
period of disability. The policy was a life insurance policy, con-
taining disability benefits. It provided that if "the insured became
totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease"
the insurer would grant certain benefits. These benefits were as
follows:
"(a) Waive Payment of All Premiums payable upon this pol-
icy falling due after the receipt of such proof and during the
continuance of such total and permanent disability; and
"(b) Pay to the Insured a Monthly Disability Annuity as
stated on the face hereof; the first payment to be payable
upon receipt of due proof of such Disability and subsequent
payments monthly thereafter during the continuance of such
total and permanent Disability."' (Italics supplied.)
The insured contended that he became totally and perman-
ently disabled within the meaning and terms of the policy on
January 7, 1939, and remained disabled to August 31, 1939. How-
ever, he presented this claim on July 9, 1940. The insurance
company contended that receipt of due proof of disability was a
condition precedent to the liability of the company to make the
disability payments of one hundred dollars a month and to waive
any premiums.
In its first hearing, the majority opinion stated that the appel-
late courts of five states had interpreted the provisions of insur-
ance policies identical with those of the policy under considera-
tion. "In every instance the Court concluded that the policy
was clear and free of ambiguity, and that submission of proof of
disability was a condition precedent to the liability of the Insurer
under the disability provisions of the policy .... These cases are
so called 'goose cases', all of the geese being of the same color and
in perfect step.' 71
Justice Hamiter concurred in that portion of the decision
relating to the waiver of premiums, but dissented from that por-
16. 217 La. 325, 46 So. 2d 286 (1949) (on rehearing 1950).
17. See 46 So. 2d 286, 288-289 (La. 1950).
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tion of the decision dealing with the monthly payment provision.
He felt that the latter portion of the policy was ambiguous and
could be interpreted as obligating the company for disability
benefits from the inception of the disability, with the obligation
dischargeable or payable on or after receipt of due proof. "Being
susceptible of two different interpretations, and hence ambigu-
ous, the disability-annuity provision should be given that con-
struction which is most favorable to the insured."
Justice Moise dissented, stating that:
"The insured purchased a policy, the prime motive and essen-
tial was to protect himself during permanent disability, and
like all other insurance contracts, his protection began from
the moment the contract was completed, that is, the delivery
of the policy, coupled with the payment of the premium. An
incidental [sic] to the contract was the method to be effected
in order to insure payment in case of disability-the sub-
mission of proof to the Company. I do not believe that the
contract should be interpreted so that a mere incidental
payment should be made to supersede the policy provisions
and the prime motive of the assured for its purchase."
On rehearing the court reversed its original opinion, and the
majority opinion was prepared by Justice Moise. The court
decided that the provisions of the policy relating to monthly dis-
ability payments were ambiguous, and should be interpreted
favorably to the insured. In addition the court noted that it had
been shown, as a matter of fact, that the company had knowledge
that the insured was in the hospital and had knowledge that the
insured had a policy for permanent disability because it had the
policy in its possession for a time during assured's disability for
the purpose of changing the beneficiary.
The court awarded the disability benefits at the rate of one
hundred dollars a month, but did not, however, award refund of
the premiums during the period of disability.
Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb dissented with written
reasons, and Justice LeBlanc also dissented.
A second rehearing was applied for and denied. In a per
curiam opinion, the court pointed out that it adhered to the view
that a disability which lasted for more than three months would
be construed as total and permanent disability under the provi-
sions of the policy because the policy provided that "such total
disability shall be presumed to be permanent when it is present
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and has existed continuously for not less than three months."
Even though the insured might later recover from his disability,
the presumption stated in the policy would be deemed conclusive.
The court pointed out that in its opinion there is authority sup-
porting this view and likewise authority to the contrary in
other states.
LEASE
J. Denson Smith*
The cases under this heading decided during the 1949-1950
term were not of any significance jurisprudentially. In Anglin v.
Nasif1 the court rejected an attempt by three plaintiffs, lessees, to
recover amounts claimed to have been paid by them in excess of
allowable rentals under applicable OPA regulations. Defendant
had converted an apartment renting at $45 per month into two
bedrooms, which he rented at $30 per month each plus $5 from
each of the plaintiffs for kitchen privileges. This was done with
the authority of the Shreveport Rent Director, and the conclusion
of the court was that defendant's action was not an illegal evasion
of the regulations, but a lawful avoidance.
Eviction proceedings brought in Canal Realty and Improve-
ment Company, Incorporated v. Pailet2 were dismissed as pre-
mature. After having accepted rent for the month of June, plain-
tiff instituted the eviction suit on June 27 without giving the
tenant ten days' notice that the contract was terminated because
of violations of its provisions. A notice to vacate previously given
was waived by the later acceptance of additional rent.
In the case of Salter v. Zoder3 the court, on certiorari, an-
nulled judgments of the district court and the court of appeal,
and found in favor of the plaintiff, who was suing for damages
resulting from injuries to his minor daughter. The daughter was
injured when she fell against a sheet of galvanized iron being
used to cover a stack of lumber placed in a driveway by the
defendant lessor. Plaintiff was a sub-lessee. The court found the
defendant negligent in obstructing the driveway in violation of
the rights of plaintiff and his family and in creating a condition
highly dangerous to children, knowing that the child in question
and Qthers were accustomed to play in the driveway. The deci-
sion rested on Articles 2315 and 2316 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 392, 46 So. 2d 309 (1950).
2. 217 La. 376, 46 So. 2d 303 (1950).
3. 216 La. 769, 44 So. 2d 862 (1950).
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